SUMMARY ORDER

Appellants moved for summary judgment as to the effect of a divorce settlement agreement on several life insurance policies’ beneficiary designations. They sought to have all policy proceeds distributed to certain of the appellants and to invalidate the designation of appellee as a beneficiary of the policies. Appellee filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking to have the policy proceeds distributed in accordance with the beneficiary designations made by the now-deceased policy holder. Appellants’ motion for summary judgment was denied, and appellee’s cross motion for summary judgment was granted. On appeal, appellants assert that summary judgment should have been granted in their favor. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

Appellants first assert that the parties to the settlement agreement agreed that their four children could be the only beneficiaries to their parents’ life insurance policies. The parties agreed that the agreement was to be construed according to Virginia law. Accordingly, we must apply that state’s requirements: “[W]here an agreement is complete on its face, is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the court is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument itself.” Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Iron Constr. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 205 Va. 841, 140 S.E.2d 629, 634 (1965)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The plain language of the settlement allows for the possibility of beneficiaries other than the children of the parties to the settlement. Likewise, the agreement places no limitation on how those beneficiaries would be permitted to use their proceeds. There is no question of material fact as to these issues; summary judgment in favor of appellee was appropriately granted.

Appellants also assert that the agreement’s provision that “[l]ife insurance coverages in favor of the children as beneficiaries may be ratably reduced by 25% as each child attains the age of twenty-three” means that no child can be completely eliminated from coverage, whatever their age. Virginia’s highest court has stated that courts are “to construe a contract as a whole, considering every word and every paragraph, if there is a sensible construc *41 tion that can be given. ” Dowling v. Rowan, 270 Va. 510, 518, 621 S.E.2d 397 (Va. 2005) (emphasis added). Here, the only sensible construction of the ambiguous “ratable reduction” provision is that the parties intended to remove each child from coverage at the age of 23. There are no genuine questions of material fact as to this issue. Summary judgment for appellee was appropriately granted.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.