SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Kenneth J. Phelan, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. (“ADA”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal, and repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.

*50 This Court reviews a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint de novo. See McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Where, as here, plaintiffs proceed pro se, courts must construe their complaints liberally, reading them with “special solicitude” and interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006).

Title II of the ADA provides, in pertinent part, that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “To prove a violation of Title II, a party must therefore establish: (1) that he is a ‘qualified individual’ with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from participation in a public entity’s sendees, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to his disability.” Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2003).

The district court concluded that Phelan, who is currently incarcerated, failed to satisfy these requirements at the pleading stage because his “conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his disability [were] insufficient to state a plausible claim for discrimination under the ADA.” The court therefore dismissed Phelan’s complaint sua sponte.

Having conducted an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the district court erred. Phelan alleges in his complaint that the defendants — various prison employees— failed to “make alterations to accommodate [his] disability,” retaliated against him, denied him his “right to receive mental health care and to see a psychiatrist,” and harassed him, all because of his disability. See Compl. 1-6. 1 He alleges that he has “been diagnosed with having Attention Deficet [sic] Disorder, and a Traumatic Brain Injury,” that he has “a nerological impairment [sic],” and that he “was on SSD + SSI my whole adult life, and was receiving services from VESID” (presumably a reference to Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities). Id. at 5. Thus, Phelan has pled sufficient facts about his disabilities to establish, at least at the pleading stage, that he is an ADA-qualified individual.

In addition, Phelan has alleged that he was denied access to public services at the prison, that he suffered retaliation when he complained, and that his alleged mistreatment was due to his disability. He alleges, for example, that a prison psychologist “flatly denie[d] [him] treatment,” id. at 19, that another doctor told him to “get out, we don’t treat retards,” id. at 21, and that a correction officer refused his request to file a grievance, allegedly telling Phelan: “Oh, you’re that fucking retard *51 that wants treatment. We don’t allow fucking inmates to file grievances.” Id. at 7. Other correction officers allegedly told Phelan that “they don’t allow retards to file grievances.” Id. at 8; see also id. at 9-12.

Taken together, these allegations and others in the complaint satisfy the pleading requirements for an ADA discrimination claim, particularly one brought by a pro se plaintiff. Phelan has alleged specific facts to show that he is an ADA-covered individual; that he was excluded from participation in mental health, library, and other services at the prison, and suffered retaliation when he attempted to complain about his treatment; and that the alleged discriminatory treatment and retaliation were due to his disability. Phelan’s complaint sets out sufficient facts to allow a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The district court therefore erred in dismissing Phelan’s pro se complaint sua sponte.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this order. Upon remand, the district court should consolidate this case with Phelan’s parallel 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, Phelan v. Hersh, 10-cv-11 (N.D.N.Y.), and appoint counsel.