SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Rockland Exposition appeals from the district court’s judgment entered September 29, 2010, dismissing its complaint. The judgment was entered pursuant to a September 29, 2010 Opinion and Order denying Rockland’s motion for partial summary judgment and granting Great American’s cross-motion for summary judgment, rejecting Rockland’s demand for a declaratory judgment that Great American is obligated to defend Rockland in a lawsuit filed against it by the Association of Automobile Service Providers (“AASP”). Rockland Exposition, Inc. v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 746 F.Supp.2d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 823, 124 S.Ct. 153, 157 L.Ed.2d 44 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2011). In determining whether genuine issues of material fact exist, we must “resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have conducted an independent review of the record in light of these principles, and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

*389 The district court correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, Rockland did not timely comply with the policy’s notice requirements. This is true for several reasons, of which the clearest is the following: The policy unambiguously provided that the insured “must ... [immediately send [the insurer] copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal papers received in connection with the claim or ‘suit.’” (Section rV(2)(c)). It is undisputed that Rockland waited a minimum of three months before it sent copies of the legal papers it had received in connection with AASP’s suit to either Marshall & Sterling, its insurance broker, or to Great American. As a matter of law, this three-month delay did not comply with the requirement to send the papers “immediately.” See Mighty Midgets, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 19, 416 N.Y.S.2d 559, 389 N.E.2d 1080 (1979) (explaining that “immediate” is a stricter requirement than “as soon as practicable”); Am. Ins. Co. v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 435, 440 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that under New York law, “delays for one or two months are routinely held” to violate the requirement that notice be given as soon as practicable). 1