SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Lidia Swiatkowski, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss her complaint as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judica-ta. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), this Court reviews a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, construing *361 the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations therein as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (Rule 12(b)(1)); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (Rule 12(b)(6)). In adjudicating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), courts may consider “evidence outside the pleadings.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “where public records that are integral to a ... complaint are not attached to it, the court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, is permitted to take judicial notice of those records.” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by that court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. Swi-atkowski attempts to avoid application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by asserting that she is challenging the defendants’ conduct in bankruptcy court in litigating a proof of claim, as opposed to their conduct in state court foreclosure proceedings. The validity of the proof of claim at issue, however, depended entirely on the validity of the underlying state court foreclosure judgment such that a decision in Swiat-kowski’s favor would effectively amount to “declaring] the state court judgment fraudulently procured and thus void.” See Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2002), narrowed on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Swiatkowski’s assertion, in fact, supports the district court’s conclusion that her claims were barred by the doctrines of collateral estop-pel and res judicata in light of determinations made in the bankruptcy proceedings.

We have considered Swiatkowski’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.