SUMMARY ORDER

Kathleen Hurtgam appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. She also appeals from the court’s grant of defendants’ motion to strike statements regarding settlement negotiations as inadmissible. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts of the case, the procedural posture, and the issues raised on appeal.

“We review an award of summary judgment de novo, and we will uphold the judgment only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom it is entered, demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the judgment was warranted as a matter of law.” Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 595 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hurtgam’s claims are time-barred. She was “require[d] ... to file a charge of discrimination or retaliation with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... within 300 days of the discriminatory or retaliatory act.” Valtchev v. City of N.Y., 400 Fed.Appx. 586, 588 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order).

That time limit began to run, at the latest, from early April 2006, when she received notice of the school’s decision to transfer her. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980); Smith v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 65 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1995). While “[fjoreknowledge” of an employer’s possible or even imminent decision to take adverse action against an employee may “not set the statute of limitations running,” Webb v. Ind. Nat’l Bank, 931 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1991), Hurtgam was notified in April 2006 that the school had already made the decision to transfer her, not that the school was contemplating the decision or might soon arrive at one. The date her transfer was to take effect is irrelevant. Therefore, her filing with the *387 EEOC in March 2007 was made after the 300-day time limit had already expired.

Accordingly, the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants is AFFIRMED, and Hurt-gam’s appeal from the district court’s grant of defendants’ motion to strike is DISMISSED as moot.