SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Efua Eli Okoh, pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss his complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. New York State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Under Rule 12(b)(6), we construe the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to *814 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Additionally, while pro se complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, we afford pro se litigants “special solicitude” and will interpret their submissions to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474-75.

Having conducted a de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the lower court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons as those stated by the court in its February 24, 2011 opinion and order. Among other things, the district court correctly concluded that with respect to Okoh’s equal protection claims, the second amended complaint failed to set forth sufficient, non-conclusory factual allegations from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Okoh suffered “adverse treatment ... compared with other similarly situated individuals,” or that “such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race.” Miner v. Clinton Cnty., 541 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. We have considered all of Okoh’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.