SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant, David A. Shane, pleaded guilty to production and possession of child pornography. On the production count, he was sentenced to 188 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On the possession count, he was sentenced to 120 months in prison and a lifetime term of supervision. The sentences will run concurrently. He was also assessed a special assessment of $200. Shane challenges these sentences as substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Shane cannot demonstrate that the District Court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of 188 months in prison and a life term of supervision. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (holding that appellate courts must review sentences for reasonableness under the “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”); accord United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). A substantive challenge requires the defendant to show that the sentence falls outside the “broad range” of sentences “that can be considered reasonable under the totality of the circumstances” and in light of “due deference [afforded] to the district court’s exercise of judgment.” United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2008); accord id. (“In short, in determining substantive reasonableness, a reviewing court will set aside only those outlier sentences that reflect actual abuse of a district court’s considerable sentencing discretion.”).

Shane cannot sustain this burden, given (1) the particulars of his offenses; (2) the District Court’s due consideration of Shane’s personal circumstances in concluding that the sentence imposed was nevertheless warranted; (3) the sentence was within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that sentences within the guidelines range are substantively reasonable the “overwhelming majority of’ the time); (4) the Sentencing Commission’s recommendation of a maximum term of supervision for sex offenders, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.2(b)(2) (Policy Statement); (5) the statutory authority to impose lifetime terms of supervision for child sex offenders in light of congressional findings that such supervision is sometimes necessary, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 42 (2003) (Conf.Rep.), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684; and (6) this Court’s authority upholding such a term of supervision, see United States v. Hayes, 445 F.3d 536, 537 (2d Cir. 2006).

We have considered all of Shane’s additional arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.