SUMMARY ORDER

Yun Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 25, 2010, order of the BIA, affirming the March 12, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Thomas J. Mulligan, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yun Zhang, No. A088 379 705 (B.I.A. Aug. 25, 2010), aff'g No. A088 379 705 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 12, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

Zhang’s asylum claim was based entirely on his wife’s forced abortion. At the hearing before the IJ, Zhang confirmed that his asylum application contained the complete set of facts concerning his claim and that there was nothing else he wished to add. However, we have explained that a woman’s forced abortion does not qualify as per se persecution with respect to her spouse. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 309 (2d Cir. 2007). Although Zhang argues that he personally suffered emotional harm due to his wife’s forced abortion, we have rejected this argument, noting that the “profound emotional loss as a partner and potential parent ... does not change the requirement that we must follow the ‘ordinary meaning1 of the language chosen by Congress, according to which an individual does not automatically qualify for ‘refugee’ status on account of a coercive procedure performed on someone else.” Id. Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that Zhang was not eligible for asylum and withholding of removal based on his wife’s forced abortion. See id.

We note that while a spouse’s forced abortion is not per se persecution, applicants may base their claims on “persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer” on account of their “other resistance” to a coercive family planning policy. See Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 308-10; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Remand for further development of the record is not required, however, because Zhang raises no “other resistance” claim before this Court, nor did so before the agency. See Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 381 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2007).

Similarly, the agency did not err in finding that Zhang failed to establish eligi-' bility for CAT relief. Contrary to Zhang’s argument, the IJ did not err in failing to analyze Zhang’s eligibility for CAT relief independently, as Zhang did not raise any independent CAT claim before the IJ. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request *20 for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 84(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).