SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant, David Raw, appeals from a judgment of the District Court dismissing his suit on the ground that the parties agreed to arbitrate. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Plaintiff cannot avail himself of Section 922 of DoddFrank (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)) because he forfeited that argument when he failed to raise it in the District Court. Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”); cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (distinguishing between forfeiture — “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right” — and waiver — “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As Plaintiff emphasizes, Section 1514A(e) did not take effect until after briefing on the motion to dismiss concluded. However, the District Court did not issue its decision until October 21, 2010— nearly three months after Section 1514A(e) took effect; after the District Court’s deci *269 sion, Plaintiff did not move for reconsideration, which afforded him an additional 28 days after the District Court’s decision to raise this argument, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); and after Plaintiff filed the notice of appeal, he did not seek relief under Rule 62.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure once he learned of Section 1514A(e). Accordingly, Plaintiff forfeited any argument regarding the implication of Section 1514A(e).

As to the issues and arguments raised by Plaintiff below, we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the District Court’s thorough opinion.

We have considered all of Plaintiffs additional arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.