SUMMARY ORDER

Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-Appellants 1 and Defendants-Appellants 2 (collectively “Appellants”) appeal the District Court’s decision (1) dismissing the interpleader complaint against Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“the FDIC”) and (2) remanding the case to the New York Supreme Court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

[1] We lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the remand order. Except in specified civil rights cases, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Thus, Section 1447(d) generally precludes appellate jurisdiction of a remand order when the remand is for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or for defects in the removal procedure. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007).

The remand in this case was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court explained that once it dismissed the interpleader complaint against the FDIC (because the FDIC had been improperly *32 made a party to the litigation), the statutory provision that supported federal jurisdiction was no longer satisfied and “should not be construed to support continued federal subject matter jurisdiction of the remaining parties’ state law claims inter se.” DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. Kontogiannis, No. 10 Civ. 9092(LTS), 2011 WL 611836, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.17, 2011).

Appellants argue that the remand was pursuant to the District Court’s election to forgo supplemental jurisdiction and that a remand based on such a decision is reviewable. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1866-67, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009). They rely on the following statement in the District Court opinion: “In that the remaining claims arise under state law and there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court also declines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to exercise any supplemental jurisdiction it may have of those claims.” DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc., 2011 WL 611836 at *3. This sentence signifies only that the District Court would not have exercised “any supplemental jurisdiction it may have [had] of those claims,” id. (emphasis added), not that it had supplemental jurisdiction and was declining to exercise it. Evidently for that reason, the District Court undertook no analysis to determine whether it had supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

In any event, the District Court’s remand could be “eolorably characterized” as for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Powerex Corp., 551 U.S. at 234, 127 S.Ct. 2411. Accordingly, “appellate review is barred by § 1447(d).” Id.

[2] We also lack jurisdiction over the dismissal of the interpleader complaint against the FDIC. In Powerex Cmp., the Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction of an appeal from a decision denying sovereign immunity and remanding the case, including jurisdiction to decide merely “the substantive issues of law that preceded the remand order.” 551 U.S. at 228, 127 S.Ct. 2411; accord id. at 227-228, 232-34, 237-39, 127 S.Ct. 2411.

Here too, Appellants appeal the District Court’s substantive decision that the case was not properly in federal court (and the resulting remand). Under Powerex Coi'p., however, we lack jurisdiction to review that decision. See id. at 238-39, 127 S.Ct. 2411 (cautioning courts of appeals that they “must take that jurisdictional prescription seriously, however pressing the merits of the appeal might seem.”)

We have considered all of the additional arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.