*45 SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Verties D. Toran, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his employment discrimination complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), accepting all factual allegations therein as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In addition, a pro se litigant’s complaint should be read liberally, and the pro se litigant should be granted leave to amend a complaint at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a district court need not grant leave to amend a complaint when amendment would be futile. Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)).

Here, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Toran’s claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (“Title VII”), and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, et seq. (“NYSHRL”), and we affirm the judgment with respect to those issues for substantially the same reasons as those articulated by the district court in its decision. See Toran v. City of Binghamton, No. 09-cv-1381, 2010 WL 2026064 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010).

We decline to address Toran’s First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on appeal. Although Toran asserted this claim below, he fails to raise this issue in his brief. “Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived.... ” Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.