SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Doyle appeals from a May 4, 2011, 2011 WL 1740305, judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gleeson, J.), dismissing Doyle’s complaint, which was brought against all of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. Doyle’s complaint sought a judgment declaring that 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) violates the United States Constitution insofar as it provides the Justices with discretion over whether to grant certiorari petitions. It also sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Justices to vacate the denial of a petition for certiorari, and grant review, in Doyle v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 583 F.3d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2099, 176 L.Ed.2d 756 (2010). On appeal, Doyle contends that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), which provides the Justices with discretion over whether to grant certiorari petitions, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. We presume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, taking its factual allegations to be true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Mortimer Off Shore Servs., Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 615 F.3d 97, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2010).

We first turn to Doyle’s contention that 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) is unconstitutional because it provides unlimited discretion to the Supreme Court over whether to grant certiorari petitions. Section 1254(1) provides that “[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by ... writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree.” Doyle first argues that the decision of whether to grant a certiorari petition is not an exercise of judicial power. He then argues that because Congress delegated this power to the Supreme Court without providing any intelligible principles that would guide and bind the Court in making certiorari decisions, 28 *52 U.S.C. § 1254(1) violates the non-delegation doctrine. We reject Doyle’s argument for substantially the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned Memorandum and Order. See Doyle v. Roberts, 10-CV-2278 (JG), 2011 WL 1740305 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). In particular, as noted by the district court:

The Supreme Court’s “approach to other nonadjudicatory activities that Congress has vested either in federal courts or in auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch has been identical to [its] approach to judicial rulemaking: consistent with the separation of powers, Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary.” New things are more appropriate to the central mission of the judiciary than the high court’s ability under § 1254(1) to manage its caseload by selecting from among more than 10,000 petitions each year the cases in which Supreme Court review will most assist not only the parties but also the lower federal courts, the coordinate branches of government, and the public at large.

Id. at *2 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989)) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).

Having determined that 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) is not unconstitutional, we similarly reject Doyle’s request for a writ of mandamus. “The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a dear nondiscretionary duty.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (emphasis added). Because the decision to grant or deny certiorari is left to the discretion of the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 876, 104 S.Ct. 1532, 79 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984) (referring to “discretionary Supreme Court review” as the “general rule”), Doyle has not established “a ‘clear and indisputable right’ to [the writ’s] issuance,” Escaler v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 582 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).

We have considered Doyle’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.