SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs are twenty-eight individuals whose judicially imposed New York State sentences specified determinate terms of incarceration, but not ensuing terms of post-release supervision (“PRS”). Nonetheless, plaintiffs were subjected to PRS terms administratively imposed by corree- *44 tions officials pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45. Plaintiffs here appeal the dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of their Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against named current and former New York State officials for imposing and enforcing these PRS terms. We review the dismissal of a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo, “accepting as true all material allegations of the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 1

1. Multiple Punishment

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their double jeopardy claim that the administrative imposition of a PRS term following a judicially imposed determinate prison term constitutes “multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n the multiple punishments context!,] the interest that the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect is limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature.” Id. at 488 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, where a legislature intends “to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.” Albe rnaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). Here, the New York State legislature undoubtedly intended that plaintiffs be sentenced to PRS terms as well as determinate sentences. When plaintiffs were sentenced, N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45 provided that “[e]ach determinate sentence also includes, as a part thereof, an additional period of post-release supervision.” N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45(1) (1998), amended by 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 141, § 3 (2008); see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (holding double jeopardy not violated “[w]here, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes”). Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to state a double jeopardy claim for multiple punishment.

Insofar as plaintiffs’ real complaint is that the legislative intent to have them serve both prison and PRS terms was effected by a combination of judicial and administrative orders, their claims raise due process, not double jeopardy, concerns. See Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding administratively imposed terms of PRS violated due process). But because a due process right to be free from administratively imposed PRS terms was not clearly established before Earley, see Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d at 107-08, the district court correctly concluded that defendants were qualifiedly immune from suit for PRS terms administratively imposed before Earley. The complaint does not sufficiently allege post- Earley administrative imposition of terms of PRS because it does not indicate which plaintiffs had terms of PRS administratively imposed without judicial resentencing, or when such terms were imposed. Indeed, on appeal, plaintiffs suggest that their PRS terms could have been imposed at any time after 2000 in arguing that, for purposes of qualified immunity, “the challenged action” occurred “when Defendants *45 started imposing PRS, in or about the year 2000/2001.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that defendants administratively imposed terms of PRS on them after our decision in Earley so as to avoid dismissal on qualified immunity grounds.

2. Expectation of Finality

Alternatively, plaintiffs submit that defendants upset their expectations of finality in their judicially imposed determinate sentences by altering them to include administratively imposed terms of PRS. See United States v. Kyles, 601 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits alterations to sentences “carrying a legitimate expectation of finality”). Plaintiffs point to no law clearly establishing a prisoner’s legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence that fails to include a PRS term mandated by law. See N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45. Defendants are thus qualifiedly immune from suit — on either double jeopardy or due process grounds — insofar as their administrative imposition of PRS terms “reified] on a presumptively valid state statute” that is not “grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional.” Vives v. City of New York, 405 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nothing in our decision in Earley signaled that an expectation of finality attached to a judicially imposed determinate sentence so as to preclude subsequent imposition of a PRS term. Indeed, after Earley, the New York State legislature authorized state courts to resentence offenders who had not received judicially imposed terms of PRS. See NY. Correct. Law § 601-d (2008). No federal or state court has held that such resentencing violates double jeopardy’s reasonable expectation of finality, except in circumstances where offenders have completed their determinate terms and been released from custody. Even as to those offenders, no court reached that conclusion until the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Williams in 2010. See People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 899 N.Y.S.2d 76, 925 N.E.2d 878 (2010).

Thus, because neither clearly established principles of double jeopardy nor due process prohibited defendants from administratively imposing legislatively mandated PRS terms before 2006, or from obtaining judicial resentencing of offenders already released from their determinate prison terms before 2010, the district court correctly granted dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity.

3. Conclusion

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 1