SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Donald Griffin, pro se, appeals from the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction, and separately appeals from the dismissal of his complaint. He alleged that his right to freely exercise his religion, protected under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U. S.C. § 2000cc-l, was violated when, in October 2008, the state denied him parole based, in part, on his refusal to participate in a sex offender counseling and treatment program. We consolidate Griffin’s appeals and assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

“We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Shomo v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011).

*28 Liberally construing his complaint to avoid mootness and the “favorable termination” rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2864, 129 L.Ed.2d 388 (1994), we find that Griffin fails to state a claim nonetheless. Griffin argues that his Presentence Report erroneously states that he sexually abused one victim; but he admits to sexually abusing another. Participants in the sex offender treatment program are not required to confess to any particular offense or act of abuse. All that is required is that participants discuss the behavior that resulted in incarceration. Griffin does not plausibly state that this requirement necessitates that he lie or otherwise “imposefs] a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion.” See Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 536 (2d Cir. 2010).

As his complaint fails to state a claim, it follows that Griffin fails to show a “clear” or “substantial” likelihood of success. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996) (articulating the standard for a preliminary injunction that will alter the status quo or “provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, the appeals docketed under 11-1047 and 11-3853 are CONSOLIDATED, and the order and judgment of the district court are hereby AFFIRMED.