SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner, Chang Le Lin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of an April 23, 2010, decision of the BIA affirming the May 5, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Annette S. Elstein denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chang Le Lin, No. A093 396 998 (B.I.A. April 23, 2010), aff'g No. A093 396 998 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 5, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s pretermission of *70 Lin’s asylum application as untimely because Lin challenges only the IJ’s factual findings regarding when and where he arrived in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 326-29 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a question of law is not implicated “when the petition for review essentially disputes the correctness of the IJ’s fact-finding”). Thus, we dismiss Lin’s petition for review with respect to his asylum claim. Because Lin does not challenge the denial of CAT relief, we address only the agency’s denial of withholding of removal.

The agency did not err in concluding that Lin failed to meet his burden of proof in demonstrating that he suffered persecution or faced a likelihood of persecution on account of his “other resistance” to China’s family planning policy. Lin was not per se eligible for asylum solely on the basis of his wife’s forced sterilization, but he could have qualified for relief by demonstrating that: (1) he engaged in “other resistance” to the family planning policy; and (2) he suffered harm rising to the level of persecution or has a well-founded fear of suffering such harm as a direct result of his resistance. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 309-310, 313 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency reasonably found, however, that the harms Lin allegedly suffered did not constitute persecution. The agency reasonably determined that Lin’s physical mistreatment did not constitute past persecution, as Lin was not detained at the time, and acknowledged that he did not need to seek any medical treatment. Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “the difference between harassment and persecution is necessarily one of degree that must be decided on a case-by-case basis”); Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a minor beating by family planning officials prior to arrest and detention by police, and carried out without any intention to arrest or detain, need not constitute persecution).

In addition, the agency reasonably determined that the fine imposed on Lin and his wife for their violation of the family planning policy did not constitute persecution, as Lin did not argue or present evidence of any economic disadvantage or deprivation suffered as a result of the fine. See Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 170-71 (BIA 2007) (defining persecution as including “the deliberate imposition of a severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life.”); see also Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 2002) (requiring at least a showing of a “deliberate imposition of a substantial economic disadvantage”).

Thus, because Lin does not present any argument, apart from past harm, as to why he would face persecution upon return to China, the agency reasonably determined that he did not establish his eligibility for withholding of removal. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178, 183-86 (2d Cir. 2004).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.