SUMMARY ORDER

Qiao Xing Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 14, 2010, order of the BIA *91 denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. In re Qiao Xing Huang, No. A077 317 960 (B.I.A. June 14, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006)(per curiam). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Huang’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, as it was her second motion to reopen and she filed it seven years after her final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011).

Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be excused when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2006), the BIA reasonably concluded that only Huang’s personal circumstances had changed, as her claim was based on the fact that she began practicing Falun Gong in the United States in 2008. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 151-56 (2d Cir. 2008).

Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Huang failed to establish that conditions in China had changed materially for Falun Gong practitioners. While the evidence indicated that repression of Falun Gong practitioners increased around the 2008 Olympics, the evidence also demonstrated that the repression has been constant and ongoing since the time of Huang’s hearing in 2001, and Huang did not submit evidence indicating that any increased repression of Falun Gong practitioners continued after the 2008 Olympics and into 2009. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard).

Finally, given the BIA’s explicit references to the documentation submitted with the motion to reopen, a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude that the BIA ignored any of Huang’s evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n. 17 (2d Cir. 2006)(holding that the BIA is not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record each” individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner as long as it “has given reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate findings”)(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Huang’s motion. See Ali, 448 F.3d at 517.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.