SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Peter Shue, proceeding pro se, appeals the from district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, Shue’s constitutional claims against federal officials are properly analyzed as claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nevertheless, we may affirm the district court’s judgment solely on the ground that Shue’s complaint failed to state a claim under the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 90 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground appearing in the record.”). Because § 1983 actions and Bivens actions “share the same ‘practicalities of litigation,’ federal courts have typically incorporated § 1983 law into Bivens actions,” including the law articulated by the Supreme Court in Heck. Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1995). As noted by the district court, the Heck Court held that a § 1983 action for monetary damages is not cognizable if a decision in the plaintiffs favor would necessarily invalidate a criminal *52 conviction that has not been reversed on appeal or otherwise overturned. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. In this case, success on Shue’s claim that he was tried and convicted with a falsified superceding indictment that was never presented to a Grand Jury would invalidate his 1996 federal conviction, see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), as would success on his claim that the Government withheld exculpatory and material impeachment evidence at trial, see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Because Shue’s 1996 conviction has not been overturned, his Bivens claims are subject to dismissal under Heck. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487,114 S.Ct. 2364. In light of this conclusion, we decline to reach the district court’s alternative analysis of Shue’s constitutional claims under the applicable statute of limitations.

Finally, there is no merit to Shue’s argument that Judge Seybert was subject to recusal for bias solely because she presided over his 1996 trial. “[Ojpinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).

We have considered Shue’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.