Parkash v. Town of Southeast

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants Ved Parkash and Aman Estates, LLC (collectively, “plaintiffs”) appeal from a September 30, 2011 Memorandum Decision issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Briccetti, J.) granting defendants’ motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ federal claims and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in dismissing their Section 1983 claims for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, they argue, inter alia, that the district court misapplied the pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and improperly reached several is *81 sues of fact in the course of granting defendants’ motions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“[W]e review the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chase Grp. Alliance LLC v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review in light of these principles, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See Parkash v. Town of Southeast, No. 10 CV 8098(VB), 2011 WL 5142669 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128545 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011). In particular, we find that plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to adequately allege that defendants’ prosecution of plaintiffs was illegitimate, a failure that is fatal to plaintiffs’ First and Fourth Amendment claims. Additionally, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment selective enforcement claim because plaintiffs failed to identify an example of a similarly situated property owner who was treated differently from the plaintiffs. See Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010). Finally, the district court correctly concluded that defendant Joseph A. Charbonneau was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Shmueli v. City of N.Y., 424 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (“It is ... well established that a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Accordingly, having considered all of plaintiffs’ arguments and finding them to be without merit, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.