SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Michael A. Whitfield, pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and affirming the determination of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that Whitfield was not disabled and therefore ineligible for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

“In reviewing the denial of Social Security benefits by the Commissioner, our focus is not so much on the district court’s ruling as it is on the administrative ruling.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “It is not our function to determine de novo whether [a plaintiff] is disabled.... ” Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996). Instead, “we set aside an ALJ’s decision only where it is based upon legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 77 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support *409 a conclusion.” Pratts, 94 F.3d at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). “On appeal, we conduct a plenary review of the administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence, considering the record as a whole, to support the Commissioner’s decision and if the correct legal standards have been applied. We may not properly affirm an administrative action on grounds different from those considered by the agency.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

After an independent and de novo review of the record consistent with these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment. The record provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that Whitfield was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. As the district court correctly determined, the ALJ did not selectively summarize the medical evidence, but rather carefully considered the conclusions of each of Whitfield’s physicians. Furthermore, the ALJ’s assessment of Whitfield’s credibility was properly based on inconsistencies between his subjective complaints and the substantial evidence in the record. See Aponte v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 728 F.2d 588, 591-92 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding the ALJ’s decision to credit the data and conclusions in the record and discount plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain).

Although Whitfield argues that the ALJ demonstrated bias and denied him a fair hearing, nothing in the record suggests that the ALJ’s decision was a product of any bias. See Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 191 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that, in order to show that an ALJ’s bias resulted in the denial of a fair hearing, a claimant must show that the ALJ exhibited a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make a fair judgment impossible”) (alteration omitted) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994)).

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.