United States v. Cossey
United States v. Cossey
Opinion
11-2549-cr United States v. Cossey
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 23rd day of April, two thousand twelve. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 Chief Judge, 9 AMALYA L. KEARSE, 10 PETER W. HALL 11 Circuit Judges. 12 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 14 United States, 15 Appellee, 16 17 -v.- 11-2549-cr 18 19 Gary Cossey, 20 Defendant-Appellant. 21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 22 23 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: George E. Baird and Molly 24 Corbett, Assistant Federal 25 Public Defenders, for Lisa A. 26 Peebles, Acting Federal Public 27 Defender, Albany, NY. 28 29 FOR APPELLEE: Elizabeth S. Riker and Lisa M. 30 Fletcher, Assistant United 31 States Attorneys, for Richard S. 32 Hartunian, United States 33 Attorney for the Northern 34 District of New York, Syracuse, 35 NY.
1 1 2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
3 Court for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, then-
4 Chief Judge).
5
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
7 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
8 AFFIRMED.
9
10 Defendant-Appellant Gary Cossey, who pleaded guilty to
11 possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B),
12 appeals the 78-month sentence imposed on re-sentencing after
13 remand, see United States v. Cossey,
632 F.3d 82(2d Cir.
14 2011) (per curiam). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
15 the underlying factual allegations, the procedural history
16 of the case, and the issues on appeal.
17 We generally review sentences for reasonableness under
18 the “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
19 United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41(2007); accord United States
20 v. Cavera,
550 F.3d 180, 189(2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
21 Reasonableness review has both a substantive and a
22 procedural dimension. United States v. Whitley,
503 F.3d 2374, 76 (2d Cir. 2007).
2 1 [1] In reviewing for procedural reasonableness, this Court
2 considers such factors as whether the district court (1)
3 failed to calculate (or improperly calculated) the
4 Guidelines range, (2) treated the Guidelines as mandatory,
5 (3) failed to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, (4)
6 selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous factual
7 findings, or (5) failed to adequately explain the sentence
8 (including an explanation for any deviation from the
9 Guidelines range). Gall,
552 U.S. at 51.
10 Cossey argues that the district court failed to
11 consider several
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including his
12 personal history and his efforts at rehabilitation. The
13 premise of that argument is that the district court must
14 have ignored particular factors or characteristics unless
15 they were mentioned during sentencing. However, “we never
16 have required a District Court to make specific responses to
17 points argued by counsel in connection with sentencing.”
18 United States v. Bonilla,
618 F.3d 102, 111(2d Cir. 2010).
19 Nor do we “insist that the district court address every
20 argument the defendant has made or discuss every § 3553(a)
21 factor individually.” United States v. Villafuerte, 502
22 F.3d 204, 210(2d Cir. 2007). In any event, the district
23 court stated on the record that it had considered (inter
24 alia) the submissions by counsel, which included the
3 1 information Cossey claims was not considered. The district
2 court also heard statements from Cossey and his family,
3 which covered these same issues. The district court’s
4 consideration of mitigating circumstances is further evident
5 from its imposition of the minimum within-Guidelines
6 sentence.
7 Cossey criticizes the district court for not imposing a
8 below-Guidelines sentence based on the report of his
9 evaluation by Dr. Jacqueline Bashkoff. A district court is
10 not required “to accept a psychologist’s conclusions at face
11 value” where, for example, a “psychologist’s report cannot
12 be squared with the court’s own judgment of the defendant’s
13 culpability and the danger he poses to society.” See United
14 States v. DeSilva,
613 F.3d 352, 356-57(2d Cir. 2010) (per
15 curiam). Dr. Bashkoff’s conclusions were contradicted by
16 Cossey’s initial statement and admissions to law-enforcement
17 officers in 2006.
18 Cossey argues that the district court may have relied
19 on information in the Pre-Sentence Report that was the
20 subject of factual disputes that the district court failed
21 to resolve. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). But the
22 district court, in providing the reasons for imposing
23 Cossey’s sentence, did not mention, or give any other
24 indication that he relied upon, any of those disputed facts.
4 1 Instead, it relied on the evidence uncovered from the
2 investigation of Cossey and Cossey’s admissions to the
3 police.
4 Finally, Cossey contends that his sentence is disparate
5 from the sentences imposed on others, similarly situated.
6 See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Cossey has not shown that his
7 sentence is disparate from other “defendants with similar
8 records who have been found guilty of the similar conduct.”
9
Id.Cossey’s long history of viewing and possessing these
10 materials coupled with his inability to permanently stop
11 (despite his best efforts) support his sentence. See
12 Cossey,
632 F.3d at 88-89(vacating previous sentence on
13 other grounds but observing that “[t]he record also contains
14 . . . evidence that would support the district court’s
15 decision that Cossey would re-offend based on an appropriate
16 consideration that he did in fact re-offend at least once”).
17 [2] Cossey also argues that his sentence is substantively
18 unreasonable. In assessing the substantive reasonableness
19 of a sentence, this Court “take[s] into account the totality
20 of the circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing
21 judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the
22 institutional advantages of district courts.” Cavera, 550
23 F.3d at 190. Given the broad range of relevant factors,
24 “the duty of a reviewing court is not to identify the
5 1 ‘right’ sentence but, giving due deference to the district
2 court’s exercise of judgment, to determine whether the
3 sentence imposed falls within the broad range that can be
4 considered reasonable under the totality of the
5 circumstances.” United States v. Jones,
531 F.3d 163, 174
6 (2d Cir. 2008). Thus, review for substantive
7 unreasonableness “provide[s] a backstop for those few cases
8 that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless
9 damage the administration of justice because the sentence
10 imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise
11 unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Rigas,
12
583 F.3d 108, 123(2d Cir. 2009).
13 The district court imposed the minimum within-
14 Guidelines sentence. We do not assume that a Guidelines
15 sentence is reasonable; but “in the overwhelming majority of
16 cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within
17 the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the
18 particular circumstances.” United States v. Fernandez, 443
19 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, in light of the “fact
20 [that Cossey] re-offend[ed] at least once,” Cossey,
632 F.3d 21 at 89, it cannot be said that the sentence fell outside the
22 range of reasonable sentences or was otherwise unsupportable
23 as a matter of law.
6 1 Cossey argues nevertheless that his sentence runs afoul
2 of United States v. Dorvee,
616 F.3d 174(2d Cir. 2010) (as
3 amended). In Dorvee, we held that the 240-month sentence of
4 a first-time offender who pleaded guilty to distribution of
5 child pornography was procedurally and substantively
6 unreasonable.
Id. at 188. In so doing, we observed that
7 courts determining sentences for offenses involving child
8 pornography must be careful not to impose sentences that do
9 not conform with the Section 3553(a) factors.
Id.at 184-
10 88. The instant case is easily distinguished. Whereas in
11 Dorvee the defendant was sentenced to 240 months, the
12 statutory maximum for his offense, here Cossey was sentenced
13 to 78 months, which, though 18 months above the statutory
14 minimum, was 42 months below the statutory maximum for his
15 offense. And, unlike the sentence imposed in Dorvee, which
16 was also subject to procedural error, the sentence imposed
17 in this case is procedurally sound, and, as explained above,
18 was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
19 We have considered all of Cossey’s additional arguments
20 and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the
21 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
22 FOR THE COURT: 23 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 24 25
7
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished