SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Xiao Jun Zhu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 2, 2011, decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. In re Xiao Jun Zhu, No. A078 444 682 (B.I.A. June 2, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zhu’s motion to reopen, filed in October 2010, was untimely because the BIA issued a final order of removal in October 2005. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Zhu contends that her recent church attendance in the United States, coupled with the Chinese government’s crackdown on underground churches in her home province of Fujian, constitutes a material change in country conditions excusing the untimeliness of her motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). As the government points out, however, Zhu fails to contest the BIA’s finding that her church attendance in the United States reflects a change in personal circumstances and not country conditions, and that, as a result, she has waived any challenge to this determination. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be -addressed on appeal). Moreover, as the BIA found, such a change in personal circumstances is not sufficient to overcome the time limit on a motion to reopen. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2006) (making clear that the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen may not be suspended because of a “self-induced change in personal circumstances” that is “entirely of [the applicant’s] own making after being ordered to leave the United States”); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that the system does not permit aliens who have been ordered removed “to disregard [those] orders and remain in the United States long enough to change their personal circumstances (e.g., by having children or practicing a persecuted religion) and initiate new proceedings via a new asylum application”).

Because the BIA did not reach the issue of Zhu’s prima facie eligibility for relief and the BIA’s finding regarding conditions in the China was dispositive of the motion to reopen, we decline to consider Zhu’s arguments concerning the adequacy of her prima facie showing.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of *831 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).