SUMMARY ORDER

Lan Yu, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a November 8, 2010, decision of the BIA affirming the April 80, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Barbara A. Nelson, which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Lan Yu, No. A099 661 325 (B.I.A. Nov. 8, 2010), aff'g No. A099 661 325 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 30, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

For asylum applications governed by the amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his or her account, and inconsistencies in his or her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). We will “defer to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reason *82 able fact-finder could make” such a ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. In this case, the agency reasonably based its adverse credibility determination on the inconsistencies between Yu’s asylum application and her testimony regarding claimed past persecution, and the insufficient corroboration of her claim that she is a practicing Christian.

As the agency noted, there were discrepancies between Yu’s asylum application and her testimony as to how she was treated in detention, how many times she was forced to stand outside in the cold, and the injuries she sustained from being outside in the cold. Yu also testified inconsistently regarding the issuance of the household registration document she presented as evidence. The agency properly relied on the cumulative effect of these inconsistencies to support the adverse credibility finding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (providing that an IJ may base a credibility determination on “the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors”). Moreover, the IJ provided Yu with multiple opportunities to reconcile her testimony and she failed to present reasonable explanations for the discrepancies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that agency need not credit an asylum applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact finder to do so).

Finally, Yu failed to provide evidence sufficient to corroborate her claim that she is a practicing Christian, either in China or in the United States, and thus reasonably fears religious persecution in China. When asked why Yu had not provided any evidence to corroborate her claim that she was a practicing Christian in China, such as a letter from her husband, her parents, or any of the other members of her house church who were present when she claims she was arrested, she responded that such letters could not be mailed from China because Chinese officials read all international mail. This explanation did not, however, explain why the only evidence supporting her claim that she is a practicing Christian was a letter from a pastor at her American church indicating that she had joined the church only a month before. The IJ noted that Yu had not asked her pastor to testify and failed to offer a persuasive explanation why. Under these circumstances the agency reasonably relied on Yu’s failure to corroborate her claim that she is a practicing Christian to support its adverse credibility determination. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”).

Therefore, in this case, the totality of the circumstances support the agency’s adverse credibility determination, and we will defer to that finding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Furthermore, because the only evidence of a threat to Yu’s life or freedom depended upon the credibility of her claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution, the adverse credibility determination in this case is dispositive of her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of *83 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).