SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Faruk Karimu appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Southern District of New York following his plea of guilty for conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute one kilogram and more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court sentenced Kari-mu principally to 70 months in prison, to be followed by five years’ supervised release, and imposed a $100 special assessment and a $2,000 order of forfeiture. On appeal, Karimu argues that the order of forfeiture should be vacated because the government waived its forfeiture allegation during Karimu’s plea hearing, and because the district court failed to take certain steps required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 32.2. In addition, in supplemental briefing filed pro se, Karimu challenges his sentence and seeks a “limited remand for the express purpose [of] allowing the district court to determine if it would have wanted to apply an additional offense level decrease in his sentencing for ‘Minor Role,’ in the offense.”

Citing the representations that it made to the district court during Karimu’s guilty plea, the government concedes that it *46 waived its forfeiture allegation, and consents to a limited remand to the district court for the purpose of vacating the order of forfeiture. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court to vacate the imposition of forfeiture. 2

Karimu’s pro se appeal of his sentence, however, is meritless. In his plea agreement, Karimu waived his right to appeal or otherwise challenge a sentence within the stipulated guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment. During his plea allocution, he confirmed that he understood this waiver. The district court sentenced Karimu to 70 months’ imprisonment, and thus Karimu is barred from pursuing this appeal. We have long recognized that under no circumstances “may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement. Such a remedy would render the plea bargaining process and the resulting agreement meaningless.” United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993). This longstanding precedent forecloses Karimu’s argument that “on its face, the particular appellate waiver provision of this plea agreement which effectively prevents judicial review of the claims is against public policy.”

In his pro se supplemental reply brief, Karimu contends, for the first time, that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because the district court “failed to address the appellate waiver to make sure the defendant understood during the plea colloquy in violation of Rule 11(c).” By failing to raise the argument until his reply brief, Karimu has waived the issue. See Connecticut Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 91 n. 13 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are generally deemed waived.”); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to consider an argument raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief). In any event, the facts belie Kari-mu’s claim. The plea colloquy transcript makes clear that the district court carefully confirmed with Karimu that he understood the consequences of the plea agreement and that his waiver was knowing and voluntary.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Karimu’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED in part, the judgment of the district court is VACATED in part, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order.