SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant John Velez appeals the dismissal on summary judgment of his complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the denial of his motion to amend. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (A district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a *628 clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.) (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). Although “[a] court should freely give leave [to amend] where justice so requires,” Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), this “must be balanced against the requirement under Rule 16(b) that the Court’s scheduling order shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause.” Holmes, 568 F.3d at 334-35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4).

Velez attempted to add Captain Hughes as a defendant 18 months after the magistrate judge’s deadline for amending pleadings, and has not shown good cause for the delay. On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Velez’s motion to amend. See Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of leave to amend where “[t]he plaintiffs delayed more than one year before seeking to amend their complaint” and, at the time they filed their motion, discovery had been completed and a summary judgment motion was pending).

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).

It is well-settled that a “prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.” Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.”). The inmate must show something more, such as that he was deprived of due process during the resulting disciplinary hearing, or that the misbehavior report was filed in retaliation for the inmate’s exercise of his constitutional rights. See Boddie, 105 F.3d at 862; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951. Velez urges us to revisit and reconsider these cases. We decline the invitation.

Finding no merit in Velez’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.