SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Bing Duan Zheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 11, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Bing Duan Zheng, No. A073 648 002 (B.I.A. Jan. 11, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. We have reviewed the BIA’s denial of Zheng’s time- and number-barred motion for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006).

An individual ordinarily may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Zheng does not dispute that his motion was time- and number-barred, but argues that he has demonstrated materially changed country conditions to excuse the time and number limitations. However, the BIA reasonably denied Zheng’s motion to reopen, concluding that he had demonstrated a “continuation” rather than a “change in the suppression of religious activity” by the Chinese government.

Zheng’s argument that the BIA erred in relying on background evidence that predates his asylum hearing is unavailing. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 2006).

Zheng’s argument that the BIA erred in citing the statistic that 90 million Christians worship in China, and that it did not consider favorable background materials in finding he had established a “continuation” rather than a “change” in country conditions is further unavailing. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). The evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that religious oppression in China is a continuation of existing policy, as the 2009 Department of State International Religious Freedom Report (“2009 DOS Report”) states that government “officials continued to scrutinize, and in some cases harass, registered and unregistered religious and spiritual groups” (emphasis added) and the 2009 Congressional-Executive Commission on China (“2009 Congressional Report”) describes the Chinese government’s “continued control [of] religious practices and repression] of religious activity outside state-approved parameters” (emphasis added). Thus, while the record does demonstrate some increase in anti-religious activities in the run up to and in the wake of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the BIA’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence and entitled to deference.

Finally, we need not reach Zheng’s argument that he established his prima facie eligibility for relief, both because the BIA’s changed country conditions finding was reasonable and because the BIA declined to reach this issue.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is *640 DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).