SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Debra Hevner, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, dismissing her housing discrimination complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo, focusing on whether a district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Following our review, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Hevner’s complaint for substantially the same reasons articulated by the District Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order of February 7, 2011. See Hevner v. Village East Towers, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3983, 2011 WL 666340 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Hevner’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.