SUMMARY ORDER

Guiqiu Jiang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a July 7, 2011 order of the BIA affirming the June 23, 2009 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel C. Videla, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Guiqiu Jiang, No. A093 389 870 (BIA July 7, 2011), aff'g No. A093 389 870 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 23, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

In the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). “We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ ” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Because Jiang filed his application for relief after May 11, 2005, we apply the credibility standard imposed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303 (2005). Under that standard, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility determination on, inter alia, the “responsiveness of the applicant,” “the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements,” and “any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. First, Jiang provided inconsistent testimony concerning whether he had lost his job in China as a result of his ex-wife’s failure to report for a sterilization appointment. Second, the IJ properly relied on inconsistencies between Jiang’s testimony and asylum application concerning whether his ex-wife hid at a friend’s house during her second pregnancy. Third, the IJ properly found that Jiang’s testimony lacked credibility, given his inability to recall basic details about: his current wife’s whereabouts when they sought to have a child, despite her allegation that she was hiding; and their applications to Chinese authorities for permission to have a child, despite the allegation in his asylum application that such permission had been denied twice.

Moreover, while not directly relevant to his claims, Jiang testified inconsistently about where he has lived in the United States, and admitted that his Texas driver’s license was fraudulently obtained, thus casting doubt on his veracity. Although minor and isolated discrepancies may be insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding, see Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 2000), the IJ reasonably relied on the cumulative effect of the noted inconsistencies and the fraudulent document to call into question Jiang’s credibility, see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007).

Jiang contends that any inconsistencies in his testimony can be explained by the fact that he suffers from memory loss and psychological problems. However, the psychological evaluation in the record— *656 while indicating that he suffers from depression, that his cognitive abilities are average, and that his “retention was mildly compromised,” J.A. 333 — does not support a conclusion that “a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled” to find that he suffers from memory loss or another cognitive disability to such a degree that the various inconsistencies in his testimony could be reconciled. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the weight afforded to evidence lies largely within the IJ’s discretion).

In sum, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was fatal to Jiang’s application for asylum and withholding of removal, as each claim was based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). Therefore, we need not address the agency’s alternate ruling on his eligibility for such relief. 1

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, petitioner’s motion for a stay of removal is DENIED as moot.