SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant David Robinson, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint against defendants-appellees New York State and various personnel of the Division of Parole (the “State”). The district court issued a memorandum decision and order, dated March 26, 2010, granting in part and denying in part the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denying Robinson’s motion for summary judgment. On June 22, 2011, the district court issued a second memorandum decision and order, granting the State’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Robinson’s remaining claims. Judgment was entered the same day. 1

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) de novo. Doyle v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 583 F.3d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2009). We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Wilson v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 625 F.3d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2010).

We have conducted an independent review of the record. With one exception discussed below, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its March 26, 2010 and June 22, 2011 decisions. 2

With respect to Robinson’s Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims based on the imposition of a special parole condition requiring Robinson to seek permission to possess a driver’s license and operate a motor vehicle, the district court, in its June 22, 2011 memorandum decision and order, found that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the claims in their entirety. We agree that as to Robinson’s claims for damages, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and thus we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the monetary claims. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil suits for damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established *907 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 78 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982))); Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven assuming a state official violates a plaintiffs constitutional rights, the official is protected nonetheless if he objectively and reasonably believed that he was acting lawfully.”).

The district court erred, however, in dismissing Robinson’s due process and equal protection claims for equitable relief on this basis. Qualified immunity only bars monetary damages — it does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief, Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 1999), which Robinson also sought in connection with his constitutional claims, see Compl. ¶ 14, Robinson v. New York, No. 09-cv-455(GLS)(RFT) (N.D.N.Y. April 16, 2009), ECF No. 1. While the district court discussed the State’s rationale in imposing the motor vehicle condition on parolees, it did not rule on the merits of Robinson’s claims. Therefore, we remand so that the district court may consider the merits in the first instance.

We have considered Robinson’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings.