SUMMARY ORDER

Christine Guckenberger appeals from a judgment of the district court entered on May 13, 2011. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

Guckenberger argues on appeal that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential Insurance Company of America. “Our standard of review for ... motions for summary judgment is de novo.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). “On a motion for summary judgment, all factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

We believe that Prudential’s evidence, including Jennifer M. Ervin’s detailed supplemental affidavit, was sufficient to raise a presumption that proper notice was mailed as required under New York state law. See N.Y. Ins. L. § 3211(c). Indeed, Prudential’s evidence provided the district court with sufficient basis to conclude that *70 Prudential’s “office practice ... [was] geared so as to ensure the likelihood that a notice of cancellation is always properly addressed and mailed.” Nassau Ins. Co. v. Murray, 46 N.Y.2d 828, 830, 414 N.Y.S.2d 117, 386 N.E.2d 1085 (1978). Because Guckenberger failed to present any evidence to rebut the presumption raised by Prudential, and indeed concedes that she could not have rebutted such a presumption, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential.

Furthermore, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over the claim on appeal that the district court improperly sanctioned Guckenberger’s counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11. “Where an award of sanctions runs only against the attorney, the attorney is the party in interest and must appeal in his or her name.” DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1988). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, however, makes clear that “[a]n appeal must not be dismissed ... for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.” Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(4).

Here, even though the notice of appeal does not specifically list Guckenberger’s counsel as a party, counsel’s intent to appeal from the district court’s order sanctioning counsel is sufficiently clear, given that the notice of appeal specifies that the judgment from which an appeal was taken not only “dismiss[ed] plaintiffs complaint” but also “sanction[ed] plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $500.” In this context, we believe that the notice of appeal makes clear that counsel intended to be a party to the appeal because counsel alone was the subject of the court’s sanction and Guckenberger would have had no direct personal stake in the outcome of an appeal from the portion of the district court’s order sanctioning counsel. Cf. Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 114 F.3d 395, 399 (2d Cir. 1997).

“We review a district court’s determination with respect to sanctions under ... Rule 11 for abuse of discretion.” Gurary v. Winehouse, 235 F.3d 792, 798 (2d Cir. 2000). We conclude there was no proper basis for sanctioning Guckenberger’s counsel. While we believe that Prudential’s evidence was sufficient to raise the presumption at issue, we are unable to conclude that counsel’s pursuit of Guckenberger’s claim — including counsel’s argument that Ervin’s supplemental affidavit was insufficient to entitle Prudential to summary judgment — warranted the sanction imposed by the district court.

Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Prudential’s favor is AFFIRMED, while the order of the district court sanctioning Guckenberger’s counsel is VACATED.