SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Darren Barcomb appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Arlene Sabo, Jerry Lottie, and Shawn Murphy on Barcomb’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference here only as necessary to explain our decision.

*647 The standards for considering a motion for summary judgment are well-established. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 875 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004). We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2012).

At issue on this appeal are claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Bar-comb, a police officer at SUNY Platts-burgh, against Sabo, the Chief of Police at SUNY Plattsburgh, and Lottie, the Assistant Chief, for false arrest in connection with Barcomb’s 2005 arrest for menacing, and for false arrest and malicious prosecution against Sabo and Murphy, a New York State trooper, in connection with charges brought against Barcomb in 2006 for impersonating a police officer. 1 The district court granted summary judgment for defendants as to both sets of claims. We affirm for substantially the reasons set out by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 8:07-cv-877, 2011 WL 1770795 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011).

As to Barcomb’s claims arising from his 2005 arrest: he does not challenge the validity of the arrest, which was pursuant to a warrant, but argues instead that, because Sabo and Lottie drove him from Plattsburgh to Long Island to bring him to the jurisdiction in which the warrant issued, he was denied his right to a prompt initial appearance before a judge in the locale where he was first detained. In support of this argument, Barcomb relies on N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 120.90(3). Barcomb’s reliance on New York law is unavailing in the context of an alleged constitutional tort. A § 1983 claim for false arrest derives from an individual’s right to be free of unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment, Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006), and state law procedural requirements do not delineate the Fourth Amendment’s protections, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008); Watson v. City of New York, 92 F.3d 31, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1996). Even were we now to find a federal right to a prompt initial appearance in the locale where an individual is arrested, any such right is not clearly established, and the district court thus correctly held that Sabo and Lottie were entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. See Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998).

With respect to the 2006 incident too, the district court correctly concluded that both Murphy and Sabo are entitled to qualified immunity as to Barcomb’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on such claims if he or she can establish that there was at least arguable probable cause to arrest or prosecute the plaintiff. See Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004); Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 572 (2d Cir. 1996). Arguable probable cause exists where either “(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Murphy had at least arguable probable cause to file criminal charges against Bar-comb for impersonating a police officer. As the district court correctly concluded, *648 in light of Barcomb’s actions during a January 1, 2006 traffic stop — even as described by Barcomb — it was reasonable for Murphy to conclude that Barcomb was presenting himself as an active police officer. There was thus at least arguable probable cause for Murphy to bring charges against Barcomb upon learning that Barcomb had been suspended from the police department and was not an active, authorized officer at the time of the stop. Sabo was likewise entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Barcomb’s claims related to the impersonation arrest. In light of the information relayed to her regarding the traffic stop, her correspondence with legal counsel, and her knowledge that Barcomb was suspended at the time of the stop, there was at least arguable probable cause supporting Sabo’s participation in the state’s criminal impersonation charge against Barcomb. That Barcomb was suspended, rather than terminated, at the time of the traffic stop does not change our analysis: Bar-comb arguably could still violate the criminal impersonation statute because he lacked authority to act as a police officer while suspended. See N.Y. Penal Law § 190.25; see also People v. Epperson, 179 A.D.2d 92, 581 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1992), aff'd, 82 N.Y.2d 697, 601 N.Y.S.2d 471, 619 N.E.2d 408 (1993).

We have considered Barcomb’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.