SUMMARY ORDER

Xue Bin Chen appeals from her conviction, following a jury trial, for conspiring to evade federal immigration law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“The trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including ... its assessment that the probative value of relevant evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the government to introduce evidence at trial relating to statements made by Chen’s husband. The husband’s statements showed how and why Chen’s attitude changed from one of denial to admission of her guilt.

*61 Furthermore, we are unable to conclude that the district court improperly prevented Chen from cross-examining a government witness regarding his having been involved in a prior disciplinary investigation. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (“[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.