SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Ze Fong Wong, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 13, 2011, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Ze Fong Wong, A077 396 983 (B.I.A. July 13, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Wong’s motion to reopen as untimely, as he filed it eight years after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.G. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be excused when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA reasonably concluded that Wong did not demonstrate changed conditions in this case.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that the background materials do not demonstrate a change in country conditions material to Wong’s claim regarding his practice of Christianity. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). While some of the evidence Wong submitted in support of his motion arguably indicates that harassment and restrictions on Christianity have increased since Wong’s 1999 merits hearing, they do not compel the conclusion that conditions for Christians in China have changed such that Wong was entitled to reopening. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (noting that, under the substantial evidence standard, in order to reverse the BIA’s fact finding, “[the Court] must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it” (italics omitted)); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that under the substantial evidence standard, “[t]he BIA findings of fact will be reversed only if a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude otherwise” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Furthermore, the BIA did not err in its conclusion that Wong’s fear of persecution under China’s family planning policy was speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding that an asylum applicant’s claimed fear of persecution was speculative based on the assertion that he might have more than one child in the future in violation of China’s family planning policy). We therefore do not address the BIA’s alternative finding that Wong did not establish a change in country conditions with respect to his family planning policy claim. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).