SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners Altin and Rita Haxhari, natives and citizens of Albania, seek review of the May 26, 2011, decision of the BIA denying their motion to reopen. In re Altin Haxhari, et al., Nos. A095 467 979/980 (B.I.A. May 26, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Altin Haxhari’s February 2010 motion was untimely and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen and was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final administrative decision. * See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7) (C) (i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number limitations, however, do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Here, the BIA determined that Haxhari demonstrated changed circumstances arising in Albania, excusing the time and number limitations on his motion to reopen, but denied the motion because he did not show prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. The BIA’s denial of Haxhari’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of *171 discretion. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988); Kaur v. BIA 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

The BIA’s finding — that the evidence Haxhari submitted in support of his claim was not material because it failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for asylum— is supported by substantial evidence. See Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). While Haxhari provided evidence that Pjeter Kola set his family home on fire, he did not provide any evidence that the underlying dispute is based on a protected ground. All accounts indicate that the disagreement between the Kola family and the Haxhari family relates to the ownership of a particular piece of property. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (personal retribution is not a ground upon which asylum can be granted); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] well-founded fear of persecution must be on account of an enumerated ground set forth in the Act, and general crime conditions are not a stated ground.”).

Moreover, Haxhari provided evidence that Kola was arrested and detained after he set the house on fire and that the Committee of Nationwide Reconciliation was mediating the feud between the two families. Consequently, as the BIA found, Haxhari did not show that the Albanian government was unable or unwilling to protect individuals from blood feuds. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that private acts can give rise to persecution if the government is shown unwilling to control such actions). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Haxhari’s motion to reopen because his evidence failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).