SUMMARY ORDER

Jian Cheng Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 13, 2011, order of the BIA affirming the October 8, 2010, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Vivienne E. Gordon-Uruakpa, denying his motion to reopen. In re Jian Cheng Chen, No. A070 894 073 (B.I.A. Sept. 13, 2011), aff'g No. A070 894 073 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 8, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). We find no abuse of discretion in this case.

*194 Initially, there is no dispute that Chen’s 2010 motion to reopen was untimely because his administrative order of deportation became final in 1998. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1008.2(c)(2). To the extent Chen contends that the time and number limitations do not apply to his motion to reopen because his motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), his arguments were properly rejected. Chen asserts that he established changed conditions in China because the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) was not established until six months after his hearing date in 1998, and this change applies to him because he has since become a CDP member in the United States. However, as the agency found, his recent membership in the CDP was a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008). Moreover, as the agency found, Chen failed to demonstrate material changed conditions in China because his evidence did not discuss the Chinese government’s treatment of CDP members returning from the United States, much less a change in the treatment of such individuals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (absent “solid support” in the record that her fear is objectively reasonable, a petitioner’s claim is “speculative at best”).

Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because the agency’s denial of Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely is dispositive, we do not consider his alternate argument that he established his prima facie eligibility for relief. See Jian Hui Shoo, 546 F.3d at 168. Chen does not challenge the agency’s denial of his motion to rescind his in absentia deportation order or its denial of his motion as a matter of discretion.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).