SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Curtis Odom, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-97; and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. Odom asserts that his former employer, the New York City Human Resources Administration (the “Administration”), discriminated against him by terminating his employment in October 2007 on the basis of his race and sex. ** We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As a precondition to filing an action in federal court under Title VII, a litigant must first have filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Francis v. City of New York, 285 F.3d 768, 766-67 (2d Cir. 2000). “[Fjiling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Francis, 235 F.3d at 767 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World, Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In New York, the statute of limitations for filing a charge with the EEOC is 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998) (abrogated on other grounds).

Here, the most recent alleged discriminatory action, Odom’s termination, occurred on October 22, 2007. Because Odom’s EEOC complaint was not filed until nearly three years later, in August 2010, it was untimely under Title VH’s 300-day statute of limitations. Similarly, because Odom did not file his federal complaint until January 2011, his claims brought under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, both of which have a three-year statute of limitations, are also time-barred. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d); see also Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007).

On appeal, Odom argues that the above time limits should be equitably tolled. This argument, however, was never presented to the district court and it is a well-established general rule that a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso, 371 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2004)). While this rule is not inflexible, and we may in our discretion disregard it when necessary to remedy a manifest injustice, Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 527 (2d *90 Cir. 1990), Odom has not adequately explained why he did not raise this issue in the district court after the Administration explicitly moved to dismiss his complaint as time-barred. The complaint, therefore, was appropriately dismissed as time-barred.

We have considered all of Odom’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.