SUMMARY ORDER

Zhu He, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 23, 2011, decision of the BIA affirming the May 25, 2010, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhu He, No. A087 467 417 (B.I.A. Sept. 23, 2011), aff'g No. A087 467 417 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 25, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions, including the portions of the IJ’s *95 decision not explicitly discussed by the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

For asylum applications, such as He’s, governed by the amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, candor, or responsiveness, as well as any inconsistencies between the applicant’s statements and other record evidence, without regard to whether the inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

The IJ found that He appeared uncomfortable and “looked up” when asked questions that diverged from his prepared statement, but He claims that he was merely searching his memory. However, He’s explanation for his questionable demeanor “misapprehends the degree of deference we must afford to the IJ’s credibility findings” because a petitioner “must do more than offer a plausible explanation ... to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that particular deference is given to the trier of fact’s assessment of demeanor because demeanor is “paradigmatically the sort of evidence that a fact-finder is best positioned to evaluate”).

He also claims that the agency’s inconsistency findings were not supported by substantial evidence because they were too “minor and equivocal,” and the agency failed to consider his plausible explanations for the inconsistencies between his testimony and his mother’s letter. However, “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the totality of the circumstances establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the agency reasonably declined to credit He’s explanation that the inconsistencies were due to a translation error because the new translation of his mother’s letter was still inconsistent with his testimony. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81 (the agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

The agency’s adverse credibility determination was further supported by He’s failure to corroborate his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (explaining that an applicant’s corroborating evidence may rehabilitate otherwise questionable testimony). Because He’s testimony was not otherwise credible, the agency properly relied on the lack of corroborative evidence, including medical records and employment verification, in finding that He failed to rehabilitate his testimony. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that the agency was not required to identify and determine whether corroborative evidence is reasonably available when the applicant was not otherwise credible). Moreover, He’s claim that the corroborative evidence identified by the agency was not reasonably available is belied by his own testimony that he failed to submit it because he did not think to request it.

Accordingly, because the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination, we defer to *96 that finding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 584 F.3d at 167. As the only evidence of a threat to He’s life or freedom depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes success on his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). Finally, He has waived his CAT claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).