SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Md. Hafizur Rahim, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment sua sponte dismissing his complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), because it is barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. Rahim alleges that, while employed as a tax inspector by the government of Bangladesh, he was subjected to an unspecified form of discrimination that resulted in his being denied a promotion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews de novo both a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), and a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001); Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2005). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although pro se complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, the Court will look for such allegations by reading pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.” *19 Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We review denial of leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011). While we have held that district courts should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend, leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).

Having conducted an independent review of the record, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Rahim’s complaint. We reject Rahim’s argument that the exception to sovereign immunity found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(A) applies, as the record contains no indication that he and Defendant-Appellee had any agreement to arbitrate their disputes in the United States. Moreover, for this same reason, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in denying Ra-him an opportunity to amend his complaint, as any amendment would have been futile.

We have considered all of Rahim’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.