SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial dated June 23, 2011, on plaintiffs suit for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. .§ 51 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Leibovitz v. N.Y.C Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2001). “Further, the district court ‘ordinarily should not grant a new trial unless it is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.’ ” Hugh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

We are unable to conclude that the jury, which heard all of the evidence, “reached a seriously erroneous result” in this case. Id. Even assuming Amtrak’s statements constituted clear admissions, the jury heard these admissions and was still unpersuaded as to the degree of injury. Moreover, the jury instruction in this case did not mislead the jury as to the correct legal standard, nor did it fail to inform the jury of the law. Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 68 (2d Cir. 2010). The language of the jury instruction given by the court “track[ed] the language Congress employed” in the FELA. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 2634, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011). While it would be preferable going forward for courts to use the language clearly approved in McBride, id. at 2635, the jury instruction in this case was not erroneous.

We find Stowe’s remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.