SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Sylvester Traylor appeals pro se from the dismissal of his amended complaint for failure to state a claim, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, see Galiano v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 684 F.3d 309, 313 (2d Cir. 2012), and the decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion, see Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 357 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 499, 181 L.Ed.2d 346 (2011). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); accord Galiano v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 684 F.3d at 313. Although we construe a pro se complaint liberally, we are still obligated to ensure that the pleading satisfies this plausibility standard. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm for substantially the same reasons as stated in the thorough and well-reasoned decision of the district court.

Traylor’s federal claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983,1985, and 1986 for various violations of his civil rights, all fail for a common reason: he has inadequately pleaded facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. Traylor fails to state a conspiracy claim under § 1985 because, although the complaint alleges a number of instances in which defendants purportedly have harmed him, he has not pleaded a non-conclusory basis for finding that these events were the result of a common agreement to discriminate against him and deprive him of his constitutional rights. See Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to plead claim for relief). Because his § 1985 claim fails, so too does his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000).

Nor has Traylor pleaded claims for relief against the defendants for their alleged individual deprivations of his federal civil rights. Traylor’s claims against the nongovernmental defendants, i.e., the defendants other than First Selectman Daniel Steward and the Town of Waterford, fail because Traylor has not demonstrated that these private parties participated at all in the alleged constitutional torts, much less that they acted under color of state law. See Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 2012); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1986). Likewise, Tray-lor’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the governmental defendants are inadequately pleaded because the complaint does not plausibly allege that he was deprived of any rights pursuant to a policy or custom adopted by the Town of Waterford or its First Selectman. See Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007).

Finally, having properly dismissed Tray-lor’s federal claims, the district court was well within its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Tray- *950 lor’s remaining state-law claims. See Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 806 (2d Cir. 2003).

We have considered Traylor’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.