SUMMARY ORDER

Christopher Davidson appeals his conviction for weapons possession and obstruction. He argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop and in declining to give a particular jury instruction concerning obstruction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Davidson was a passenger in a car stopped by the police on the ground that its left brake light was defective. The district court found that the car was not in compliance with § 376 of New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL), which requires a vehicle to have “signaling devices and reflectors of a type approved by the Commissioner which are in good working condition.” N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 876(1) (McKinney 2006). Davidson does not challenge the district court’s finding that his left brake light was defective: one of the paired bulbs in the left taillight assembly was out. Instead, he asserts that another statute, § 375(40)(b), specifically governs “stop lamps” and that therefore the court should have applied § 375 instead. But these statutes are not in tension; they complement one another. As a result, the district court properly concluded that under VTL § 376 the officers had a “reasonable suspicion” to stop the vehicle in which Davidson was a passenger. United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1994).

Davidson also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant his requested instruction as to all three obstruction counts that “the government *67 must prove that the defendant foresaw the possibility that Mr. Felton’s lie would make its way to a federal proceeding.” A 347 (emphasis added). This is an inaccurate statement of the law. Section 1512 expressly provides that “no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance ... that the official proceeding ... is before a judge or court of the United States....” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g)(1). The district court committed no error by refusing this charge, and Davidson’s convictions therefore must stand. See United States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A conviction will not be reversed ... unless the requested instruction was legally correct[.]”).

Finding no merit in Davidson’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.