*96 SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Theresa Wilson, pro se, appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants-Ap-pellees in her employment discrimination action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1988, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and decide whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

We have conducted a de novo review of the record in light of the above standards and now affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in its December 9, 2010 decision and order. To the extent Wilson raises arguments on appeal concerning incidents that were not referenced by the district court in its order, these incidents also do not give rise to an inference of discrimination.

First, Wilson argues that Captain Edward Edwards’ discriminatory intent may be inferred from the fact that he punished Wilson for omitting control log entries while, on the same date, ignoring a white male officer’s more serious infraction of placing a male prisoner and a female prisoner together in the same cell. In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Wilson presented no evidence that Edwards was aware of the white male officer’s placement of the male and female prisoners in the same cell, or even that it was his responsibility to discipline such a violation. Accordingly, there is no “objectively identifiable basis for comparability” between the discipline Edwards imposed on Wilson and the discipline he allegedly failed to impose on the white male officer. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).

Second, Wilson argues that Lieutenant John Trotta singled her out because she is black, as demonstrated by his issuance of a “command discipline” to her, but not to other officers present in his office after he instructed them on the use of the New York City Police Department’s telephone answering policy. However, Wilson admits that she was disciplined for throwing out the written telephone policy Trotta had just handed to her, which Trotta found discourteous. Wilson introduced no evidence that the other officers present at the meeting, who were not black, behaved similarly. Again, there is no objective basis upon which to compare Wilson’s discipline to that of the other officers. See id.

Finally, Wilson argues that Edwards’ reference to her wearing her hair in dreadlocks constitutes evidence of discriminatory intent. Wilson was not disciplined for having dreadlocks, however. Although she was disciplined five months later be *97 cause her hair touched her collar — a patrol guide violation — the record indicates that Edwards also disciplined white and male officers for the same infraction.

We have considered all of Wilson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.