SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kingsley Brown, pro se, appeals a judgment entered February 9, 2011, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appel-lee Brian Fischer on plaintiffs claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo; the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, this Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the *960 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). We have conducted a de novo review of the record in light of the above standards and now affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge in his December 8, 2010 report and recommendation, which was adopted in its entirety by the district court.

Brown argues additionally that the district court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint. The district court, however, “has the discretion to deny leave if there is a good reason for it, such as futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 101 (2d Cir. 2002). Here, Brown failed to move for leave to amend his complaint before the close of discovery or after receiving Fischer’s summary judgment motion, which specifically argued that Fischer was an improper defendant. Instead, Brown requested leave to amend his complaint and reopen discovery when he filed his objections to the report and recommendation, more than eight months after the summary judgment motion had been filed, a year after discovery had closed, and almost two years after the initial complaint had been filed. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s request for leave to amend. See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend complaint two months after discovery had closed and nearly two years after the filing of the original complaint).

We have considered all of Brown’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.