SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Mehdi Gabayzadeh, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his action against his former attorneys for fraudulent misrepresentation and false billing, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and from the denial of his motion for leave to amend. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations therein as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Chase Grp. Alliance LLC v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2010). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

We review the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. See Nettis v. Levitt, 241 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 2001). “While generally leave to amend should be freely granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), it may be denied when there is a good reason to do so, such as futility, bad faith, or undue delay.” Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1996)).

Here, an independent review of the record and case law reveals that the district court was correct to dismiss Gabayzadeh’s first amended complaint, for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation. In denying Gabay-zadeh’s subsequent request to stand on his original complaint and to file a second amended complaint reasserting his claims contained therein, the district court relied in part on the magistrate judge’s determination of bad faith, which was based on consideration of materials outside the pleadings. We need not here decide whether such reliance comported with the notice requirements of our precedents, see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Polyvision Corp., 474 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2007); accord Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 307-09 (2d Cir. 2009), because we conclude that Ga-bayzadeh’s original complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thus, because granting leave to amend would in any event have been futile, the complaint was properly dismissed. See Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d at 130.

We have considered all of Gabayzadeh’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.