SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Craig Matthews, a New York City police officer, appeals from dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claims against his employer, the City of New York, and individual supervisors. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 429 (2d Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, however, the complaint must state a claim to relief that is plausi *533 ble on its face, which requires the plaintiff to plead facts permitting “the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In applying these standards here, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to vacate.

“To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between this adverse action and the protected speech.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2011). Where the plaintiff is a public employee, his ability to sue for such First Amendment retaliation further requires that he have spoken “as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951.

Matthews contends that the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that his speech to precinct commanding officers about the quota system imposed on him and other officers by direct supervisors was pursuant to official duties and therefore not protected by the First Amendment against retaliation. Matthews alleges that he told his commanding officer on multiple occasions in 2009 that a quota system existed. Matthews further alleges that, in 2011, he told a new commanding officer not only that a quota system existed, but also that it “was causing unjustified stops, arrests, and summonses because police officers felt forced to abandon then-discretion in order to meet their numbers.” Compl. ¶ 28. He also told the commanding officer that “the quota system was having an adverse effect on the precinct’s relationship with the community.” Id.

Accepting Matthews’s allegations as true, it is undisputed that his speech addressed a matter of public concern. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that speech pertaining to police misconduct is a matter of public concern). That conclusion is only reinforced by the fact that, by 2011, the quota system he alleged existed violated New York law. See N.Y. Labor Law § 215-a (McKinney 2012) (effective Aug. 30, 2010). The record in this case is not yet sufficiently developed, however, to determine as a matter of law whether Officer Matthews spoke pursuant to his official duties when he voiced the complaints made here in the manner in which he voiced them. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 424-26, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (distinguishing between giving employees an internal forum for their speech and making certain speech a duty of employment). As we have recently observed, “whether a public employee is speaking pursuant to h[is] official duties is not susceptible to a brightline rule.” Ross v. Breslin, 693 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2012). The matter may require some inquiry into “the nature of the plaintiffs job responsibilities, the nature of the speech, and the relationship between the two.” Id. Here, some discovery as to these matters is necessary before it can be decided whether Matthews can or cannot pursue a First Amendment retaliation claim in this case.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.