SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Victor Woodard appeals from a judgment entered on December 29, 2011 in favor of defendants dismissing his complaint in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Woodard alleged that his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was found guilty in disciplinary proceedings of writing an anonymous threatening letter while incarcerated at the Coxsackie Correctional Facility in May 2008. He contends that the finding was supported by insufficient evidence. The district court denied Woodard’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo an award of judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 429 (2d Cir. 2011).

Prison inmates subject to discipline are entitled to, inter alia, “a written state *57 ment of the disposition, including the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken.” Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). “[J]udicial review of the written findings required by due process is limited to determining whether the disposition is supported by ‘some evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985)). “This standard is extremely tolerant and is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that supports the disciplinary ruling.” Id. (citation and ihternal quotation marks omitted). “Nevertheless ... the ‘some evidence’ standard requires some ‘reliable evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Even if a disciplinary disposition is not supported by “some evidence,” state officials are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability for actions performed in the course of their duties insofar as “then-conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Luna, 356 F.3d at 490 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “For a right to be clearly established, it ‘must have been recognized in a particularized rather than a general sense.’ ” Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 244 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 214 (2d Cir. 2007)).

Even assuming arguendo that the “some evidence” standard is not satisfied in this case, defendants nevertheless have qualified immunity from liability because they did not violate clearly established law. Here, the hearing officer, defendant R. Shanley, explained that he relied on a written report of a correction officer stating that the officer compared the threatening letter to documents in twelve inmate guidance folders before coming across Woodard’s admitted writing samples and concluding that they were “similar and consistent to” the threatening letter. Shanley also relied on the testimony of another officer who compared Woodard’s writing samples to the threatening letter and independently concluded that Woodard was the author of the threatening letter. Finally, Shanley relied on his own inspection of the handwriting samples, informed by his experience evaluating handwriting as a hearing officer, to conclude that Woodard wrote the threatening letter.

“[N]either this circuit nor the Supreme Court has clearly defined standards for determining what constitutes ‘some evidence’ in the context of prison disciplinary hearings; rather, decisions have addressed the problem piecemeal, focusing on the discrete problems raised by the facts of particular cases.” Sira, 380 F.3d at 81. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has held that three lay handwriting opinions are insufficient to prove authorship of a threatening communication in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, or that additional corroborating evidence is necessary. Thus, defendants’ conduct did not violate Woodard’s clearly established due process rights.

We have considered Woodard’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.