SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Laverne Stevenson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-17 (“ADA”), complaint as time-barred. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

Upon such review, we conclude that Stevenson’s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned order. In order to be timely, an ADA claim must be filed “within 90 days of the claimant’s receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission].” See Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Stevenson has not shown that she timely filed the instant suit. Nor has Stevenson demonstrated the *518 existence of “rare and exceptional circumstances” that justify the equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline. Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 338 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). We have considered all of Stevenson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.