SUMMARY ORDER

James Hawkins-El, III, appeals pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Irizarry, J.) dismissing his complaint brought pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2605, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 821 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon such review, we conclude that Hawkins-El’s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons stated in the district court’s memorandum and order. See Hawkins-El v. First American Fund, LLC, No. 11-cv-2423 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2012, ECF No. 44). We have considered all of Hawkins-El’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.