SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Li Xing Lian, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the September 8, 2011 decision of the BIA affirming the March 29, 2011 decision of immigration judge (“IJ”) Elizabeth Lamb denying her motion to reopen. In re Li Xing Lian, No. A073 201 298 (B.I.A. Sept. 8, 2011), aff'g No. A073 201 298 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 29, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The agency’s denial of Lian’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005). An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Lian’s 2011 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 1997. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Although the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), Lian did not present any evidence showing country conditions in China for Christians in the present day, or comparing conditions to those at the time of her proceedings in 1997, but instead acknowledges that conditions for Christians in China have not significantly worsened. Lian argues that the relevant change is the Chinese government’s awareness that she organized an underground church in China. Assuming without deciding that such a change in awareness may be sufficient to establish changed country conditions excusing the applicable filing deadlines, the BIA did not err in concluding that the evidence did not establish a realistic possibility of persecution in China. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2005).

The BIA’s decision to accord limited weight to the two Village Committee Notices (“notices”) and to the letters from Lian’s aunt and former neighbor was not erroneous. The notices were photocopies that lacked indicia of authenticity, and the letters were from interested witnesses. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). Additionally, the notices do not establish that Lian’s treatment in China would rise to the level of persecution, see Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 172 (2d Cir. 2008), and the statements by Lian’s aunt and former neighbor are speculative and do not establish an objectively reasonable chance of persecution, see id. at 162.

Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it declined to toll the filing deadline for Lian’s motion to reopen based on her ineffective assistance of counsel *67 claim. Lian has not complied with any of the procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988), has made no attempt to show that she was prejudiced by her former counsel’s allegedly ineffective assistance, and has not demonstrated that she exercised due diligence in pursuing her claim. See Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2000); Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 882 (2d Cir. 1994).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.