SUMMARY ORDER

Ingrid Cotterell Ingram appeals pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.) dismissing her employment discrimination suit against her former employer, Just Energy. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon such review, we conclude that Ingram’s appeal is without merit for the reasons articulated by the district court in its memorandum and order. See Ingram v. MacDonald, No. 10-cv-3859 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012, ECF No. 111). We have considered all of Ingram’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.