SUMMARY ORDER

These cross-appeals arise from the district court’s order granting an award of *159 attorney’s fees to appellants Bosco, Bisig-nano & Mascólo and Dougherty, Ryan, Giuffra, Zambito & Hession (“Designated Counsel”) for the common benefit work that they performed in this mass tort litigation arising out of the October 2008 Staten Island Ferry crash. We review the fee award for abuse of discretion, which we will not identify absent “a mistake of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding.” Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 48, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2000) 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm the challenged fee awards in all respects.

1. Procedural Arguments

At the outset, we reject Cross-Appellants’ argument that Designated Counsel waived attorney’s fees for the duration of the litigation. Insofar as Cross-Appellants argue that the joint management orders submitted to the district court made no mention of attorney’s fees, that purported omission is insufficient to demonstrate waiver, which constitutes “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right” and “which is not created by negligence, oversight, or silence.” Amerex Grp., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Cross-Appellants identify no error — let alone clear error — in the magistrate judge’s finding, following an evidentiary hearing, that Designated Counsel did not agree to forgo attorney’s fees for the common benefit work.

Further, even if we were to assume, as the magistrate judge did, that Designated Counsel’s fee motion was untimely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2), we identify no abuse of discretion in the finding that the delay was attributable to excusable neglect. See Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 378 F.3d 220, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (reciting excusable neglect standard); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(B). Insofar as Cross-Appellants complain that the district court erred in failing to consider the prejudice they suffered, that contention is belied by the record and without merit, as Cross-Appellants had notice as early as 2004 that Designated Counsel sought attorney’s fees for common benefit work.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to Cross-Appellants’ judicial estop-pel argument. Cross-Appellants cannot show that Designated Counsel earlier took a position on fees clearly inconsistent to their present position. Much less can they show that the district court somehow adopted Designated Counsel’s earlier fees position, when no such position was submitted to the court. See DeRosa v. Nat’l Envelope Corp., 595 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (requiring party urging judicial es-toppel to show, inter alia, that opposing “party’s later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position” and “party’s former position has been adopted in some way by the court in the earlier proceeding” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. Merits

Although both Designated Counsel and Cross-Appellants argue that the district *160 court erred in adopting the magistrate judge’s fee calculation, after an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the district court acted well within its considerable discretion in allocating attorney’s fees in this case. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d at 47 (“[Ajbuse of discretion — already one of the most deferential standards of review — takes on special significance when reviewing fee decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court’s decisions to (1) use the lodestar method to determine fees, (2) use a 1.25 multiplier for the fee award, and (3) increase the award by 10% to account for fee counsel all fall “within the range of permissible decisions,” Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), as do its determinations of who should contribute to the fee fund. Thus, “giv[ing] substantial deference to [the district court’s] determinations, [and] in light of [its] superior understanding of the litigation,” we see no reason to disturb the district court’s fee determination. Fox v. Vice, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2216, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s fee award in all respects.